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Abstract
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players
in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution,
the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. The average tree solution is defined to be the
average of all these payoff vectors. It is shown that if a game has a complete communication structure, then
the proposed solution coincides with the Shapley value, and that if the game has a cycle-free communication
structure, it is the solution proposed by Herings, van der Laan and Talman in 2008. We introduce the notion
of link-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies
in the core. In general, link-convexity is weaker than convexity. For games with a cycle-free communication
structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity.
JEL classification: C71
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1. Introduction
A situation in which sets of players can realize joint payoff by cooperating can be formulated as a
cooperative game (N,v), where N = {1, . . . ,n} is a finite set of players and v : 2N→R a characteristic function
with v(S ) the joint payoff that the players in S ⊂ N can obtain by cooperation. In the standard approach it
is assumed that any coalition S can form and achieve worth v(S ). However, there are many situations of
interest where cooperation among people depends on how they can communicate and coordinate.
In a seminal paper, Myerson (1977) formulates games with communication structure by a triple (N,v,L),
where N is a set of players, v : 2N → R a characteristic function, and L ⊂ {{i, j}| i, j ∈ N, i , j} a set of edges
on N representing communication links between players. A coalition S can only cooperate if the set of nodes
S is connected in the graph (N,L). The Myerson value of a game with communication structure equals the
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Shapley value of the so-called Myerson restricted game, induced by the communication structure, and is
characterized by component efficiency and fairness.
Alternative characterizations of the Myerson value are given in Myerson (1980) and Borm, Owen, and
Tijs (1992). In the latter paper also another solution for games with communication structure has been
proposed, the so-called positional value, see also Meessen (1988). This value is characterized by component
efficiency and balanced total threats, see Slikker (2005). Recently, Herings, van der Laan, and Talman
(2008) introduced a new solution for the class of games with cycle-free communication structure, the so-
called average tree solution. This solution is characterized by component efficiency and component fairness.
The average tree solution lies in the core if the characteristic function v is superadditive. This property does
not hold for the Myerson value and the positional value.
In this paper we generalize the average tree solution to the class of all games with communication
structure. A tree (N,T ) is a cycle-free directed graph, with T a collection of n− 1 directed edges, such
that for exactly one node, the root, there exists a unique directed path in (N,T ) to every other node. To
generalize the average tree solution to the class of all games with communication structure, we define for
every graph (N,L) a collection of admissible spanning trees on the graph. A spanning tree is admissible if
each player has exactly one successor in each component of his subordinates. The payoff of a player in a
given admissible spanning tree is then the marginal contribution of that player when he joins his subordinates,
and the proposed average tree solution is the average of the payoff vectors for all admissible spanning trees.
We show that for games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution coincides with
the average tree solution in Herings et al. (2008) and that for games with complete communication structure
the average tree solution coincides with the Shapley value.
We also introduce the notion of link-convexity for games with communication structure. For games with
complete communication structure, the notion of link-convexity coincides with convexity, but in general
the notion of link-convexity is weaker than convexity. For games with cycle-free communication structure,
link-convexity is even weaker than superadditivity. It is well known that for convex games the Shapley
value lies in the core and so the Myerson value lies in the core of the game when the (restricted) game is
convex. We show that for arbitrary games with communication structure, the average tree solution is in the
core if the game is link-convex. This confirms the result of Herings et al. (2008) for a game with cycle-free
communication structure that the average tree solution is in the core if the game is superadditive. We further
illustrate that the Myerson value may not be in the core if the game is link-convex but not convex.
We notice that following this study, Baron et al. (2008) define and axiomatize the average tree solution
for any class of spanning trees. They prove that our set of spanning trees is the largest class of spanning trees
such that the corresponding average tree solution is a Harsanyi solution.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section on games with communication
structure. In Section 3 the average tree solution for all games with communication structure is introduced.
In Section 4 the classes of cycle-free and complete communication structures are discussed. In Section 5
the notion of link-convexity is introduced and it is shown that the average tree solution lies in the core if the
game is link-convex. Section 6 concludes.
2. TU-games with communication structure
A transferable utility cooperative game with communication structure is represented by (N,v,L) with
N = {1, . . . ,n} a finite set of players, v : 2N → R a characteristic function, and (N,L) an undirected graph with
node set the set of players N and a set of edges L, being a subset of {{i, j} | i , j, i, j ∈ N}. The set L stands
for the collection of communication links between players.
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A sequence of different nodes (i1, . . . , ik′ ) is called a path from i1 to ik′ in the graph (N,L) if {ik, ik+1} ∈ L
for k = 1, . . . ,k′ − 1. A coalition of players S ∈ 2N forms a network in the graph (N,L) if S is connected
in the graph, i.e., for any i, j ∈ S , i , j, there is a path in S from i to j. Notice that the empty set and all
singleton coalitions are networks by definition. A coalition S of players is called a component in the graph
(N,L) if S forms a network and S cannot form a larger network with any other player j ∈ N \S . A sequence
of at least three different nodes (i1, . . . , ik′ ) is called a cycle in the graph (N,L) if (1) it is a path in (N,L) and
(2) {ik′ , i1} ∈ L. A graph (N,L) is cycle-free if it does not contain any cycle. For given graph (N,L), each
K ∈ 2N induces the subgraph (K,L(K)), with L(K) = {{i, j} ∈ L | i, j ∈ K} the set of links on K. For K ∈ 2N , let
CL(K) denote the collection of all networks in the graph (K,L(K)) and let ĈL(K) denote the collection of all
components in (K,L(K)).
A directed graph on N is a pair (N,D) such that D ⊂ {(i, j) ∈ N ×N | i , j} is a collection of directed
edges. A player i is a predecessor of j and j a successor of i in D if (i, j) ∈ D. A sequence of different
nodes (i1, . . . , ik′ ) is called a directed path from i1 to ik′ in the directed graph (N,D) if (ik, ik+1) ∈ D for
k = 1, . . . ,k′ − 1. A tree (N,T ) is a directed graph, with T a collection of exactly n− 1 directed edges, such
that from exactly one node, called the root, there is a unique directed path to every other node. A player j
is a subordinate of i in T if T contains a directed path from i to j. Given an undirected graph (N,L), a tree
(N,T ) is a spanning tree of (N,L) if (i, j) ∈ T implies {i, j} ∈ L, i.e., any directed edge in T is an undirected
edge in L.
In the game (N,v,L), a coalition S of players can only cooperate and realize the worth v(S ) if S forms
a network. In the rest of the paper, we assume without loss of generality that N is connected, so N itself
forms a network and can realize its worth v(N). Otherwise, the analysis can be done analogously for each
component in the graph (N,L). When each pair of players can communicate, i.e., L = {{i, j} | i , j, i, j ∈ N},
(N,v,L) is said to be a game with complete communication structure and often denoted by (N,v).
A payoff vector x ∈ Rn of (N,v,L) is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff xi ∈ R to every player i ∈ N.
We write x(S ) =
∑
i∈S xi for S ∈ CL(N). A payoff vector x is efficient if x(N) = v(N). A solution for games
with communication structure is a mapping F that assigns to every game with communication structure
(N,v,L) a set of payoff vectors F(N,v,L) ⊂ Rn. A solution F is efficient if for any (N,v,L) every element of
F(N,v,L) is efficient.
The best-known set-valued solution for games (N,v) is the core, see Gillies (1953), which assigns to
every game (N,v) the set C(N,v) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), and x(S ) ≥ v(S ), for all S ∈ 2N} of undominated
efficient payoff vectors. For games with communication structure (N,v,L) the core becomes equal to the set
C(N,v,L) given by
C(N,v,L) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), and x(S ) ≥ v(S ), for all S ∈CL(N)}. (1)
It holds that C(N,v,L) is equal to C(N,vL), where vL is the characteristic function of the Myerson restricted
game (N,vL) induced by (N,v,L) and defined for S ∈ 2N by vL(S ) =
∑
K∈ĈL(S ) v(K).
The best-known single-valued solution for games (N,v) is the Shapley value, see Shapley (1953), which
assigns to every game (N,v) the average φ(N,v) of all n! marginal vectors mπ(v) ∈ Rn of the game (N,v),
where π= (π(1), . . . ,π(n)) is a permutation π : N→N assigning a unique number π(i) ∈N to every player i ∈N
and mπ(v) = (mπ1(v), . . . ,m
π
n(v)) with, for every j ∈ N, m
π
j (v) = v(π
j∪{ j})− v(π j) and π j = {i ∈ N | π(i) < π( j)}.
The Myerson value, see Myerson (1977), is a single-valued solution assigning to every (N,v,L) the Shapley
value φ(N,vL) of the Myerson restricted game.
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3. The average tree solution
To extend and generalize the average tree solution for games with cycle-free communication structure
as introduced in Herings et al. (2008) to the class of all games with communication structure, first notice
that when a graph (N,L) is not cycle-free, not all links are needed to communicate. For a particular player
i, every spanning tree on (N,L) having player i as root describes a possibility in which player i is able to
communicate with the other players. We only consider spanning trees in which any player is linked to just
one successor in every component of the set of his subordinates. We first give the definition of an admissible
n-tuple of coalitions.
Definition 1. For given graph (N,L), an n-tuple B = (B1, . . . ,Bn) of n subsets of N is admissible if it satisfies
the following conditions:
(1) For all i ∈ N, i ∈ Bi, and for some j ∈ N, B j = N;
(2) For all i ∈ N and K ∈ ĈL(Bi \ {i}), we have K = B j and {i, j} ∈ L for some j ∈ N.
Condition (2) of Definition 1 states that for every i ∈N each component in the subgraph (Bi \{i},L(Bi \{i}))
is equal to Bh for some player h being linked to player i. The same condition also implies that every set Bi
is a network. We interpret Bi as the set of subordinates of player i together with player i himself. We define
the directed graph (N,T B) as
T B = {(i, j) | B j ∈ ĈL(Bi \ {i}), i ∈ N}. (2)
Lemma 1. For a graph (N,L), let B be an admissible n-tuple of coalitions. Then the following properties
hold.
(1) There exists a unique player i ∈ N such that Bi = N.
(2) For all i, j ∈ N, i , j, either Bi ⊂ B j \ { j}, or B j ⊂ Bi \ {i}, or both Bi∩B j = ∅ and Bi∪B j <CL(N);
(3) The directed graph (N,T B) is a spanning tree.
Proof. From Condition (1) of Definition 1 it follows that Bi = N for some i ∈ N. By Condition (2) of
Definition 1, for every K ∈ ĈL(Bi \ {i}) there exists j ∈ N such that K = B j and {i, j} ∈ L, which leads to
edges (i, j) of T B. Next we continue this procedure with every j chosen in the previous step for which the
network B j is not a singleton. We proceed in this way until all remaining networks are singletons. It follows
immediately that T B is a spanning tree, which proves (3). Observe that, for all j ∈ N, B j \ { j} is the set of
subordinates of player j in the spanning tree T B. Therefore, there is a unique i ∈ N for which Bi = N, which
proves (1).
To prove (2) consider two nodes i and j. Because T B is a spanning tree, either Bi ⊂ B j \ { j} or B j ⊂ Bi \ {i}
or Bi ∩B j = ∅. It remains to be shown that Bi ∪B j is not a network in the last case. Since T B is a spanning
tree, there is j′ , i, j such that Bi ⊂ B j′ and B j ⊂ B j′ . Let B j′ be the minimal set with these properties. More-
over, there is no ( j′, j′′) ∈ T B such that both Bi ⊂ B j′′ and B j ⊂ B j′′ , since otherwise B j′′ is a proper subset of
B j′ . It follows that Bi and B j belong to different components of ĈL(B j′ \ { j′}), so Bi∪B j is not connected. 
In the spanning tree T B, the root player i communicates with a subordinate h in T B through his successor
j in the component K of ĈL(N \ {i}) that contains h. Then B j = K and on his turn, player j communicates
with his subordinates through his successors in the components in ĈL(B j \ { j}), and so on. The following
example illustrates the concept of admissible n-tuples and their induced spanning trees.
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Example 1. Let (N,L) be given by N = {1,2,3,4} and L = {{1,2}, {2,3}, {3,4}, {4,1}}. Consider the case where
B1 = N. By Condition (2) of Definition 1, for the unique component K = {2,3,4} of the subgraph on {2,3,4},
there exists a player i such that {1, i} ∈ L and Bi = K. It holds that i = 2 or i = 4. First, take i = 2, then
B2 = {2,3,4}. For the unique component K′ = {3,4} of the subgraph on B2 \ {2} = {3,4}, there is a player j
such that {2, j} ∈ L and B j = K′. Clearly, j = 3 and it follows that B3 = {3,4}. Finally, B4 = B3 \ {3} = {4} is a
leaf. Analogously, when i = 4 is taken, B4 = {2,3,4}, B3 = {2,3}, and B2 = {2}. So there are two admissible
n-tuple of coalitions with B1 = N. By symmetry, for any i ∈ N there are two admissible n-tuples of coalitions
with Bi = N and thus there are in total 8 admissible n-tuples of coalitions. The two sets of admissible n-
tuple of coalitions with B1 = N induce two spanning trees with player 1 as root, T1 = {(1,2), (2,3), (3,4)}
and T2 = {(1,4), (4,3), (3,2)}. Observe that there are also two other spanning trees with player 1 as root,
namely T3 = {(1,2), (1,4), (2,3)} and T4 = {(1,2), (1,4), (4,3)}, but these spanning trees do not correspond to
an admissible n-tuple of coalitions, because player 1 has two successors in component {2,3,4} of ĈL(N \{1}).

For a game with communication structure (N,v,L), let BL denote the collection of all admissible n-tuples
of coalitions B = (B1, . . . ,Bn) for the graph (N,L).
Definition 2. For a game with communication structure (N,v,L), the marginal contribution vector mB(N,v,L) ∈
Rn corresponding to B ∈ BL is the vector of payoffs given by
mBi (N,v,L) = v(Bi)−
∑
K∈ĈL(Bi\{i})
v(K), i ∈ N.
At mB(N,v,L) every player i ∈ N receives a payoff equal to the worth of network Bi minus the total worth
of the components of (Bi \ {i},L(Bi \ {i})). With respect to the corresponding spanning tree T B, the marginal
contribution gives to every player the value of the network consisting of himself and his subordinates minus
the total payoff assigned to his subordinates. Notice that a marginal contribution vector mB(N,v,L) is a
marginal vector mπ of the restricted game (N,vL) for any permutation π satisfying Bi \ {i} ⊂ πi for all i ∈
N. We remark that the marginal contribution vector of a spanning tree that does not belong to the set BL
of admissible spanning trees is not guaranteed to be a marginal vector of the restricted Myerson game.
Therefore the spanning trees outside BL are less appropriate.
Definition 3. Average tree solution
On the class of all games with communication structure (N,v,L), the average tree (AT) solution assigns the







In Baron et al. (2008) it is shown that the average tree solution can be axiomatized, and that the set BL is
the largest class of spanning trees such that the average of the corresponding marginal contribution vectors
is a Harsanyi solution. In addition to the marginal vector property this also justifies our choice of the set of
admissible spanning trees from a different perspective.
4. Special cases
In this section we discuss the average tree solution for games with cycle-free communication structure
and complete communication structure.
5
Lemma 2. Let (N,L) be a cycle-free graph. Then for every i ∈ N there is exactly one admissible n-tuple of
coalitions such that Bi = N.
Proof. For some i ∈ N, take Bi = N. Since the graph is cycle-free and connected, player i is linked to exactly
one player in each component of N \ {i}. For given K ∈ ĈL(N \ {i}), let j ∈ K be the unique player such that
{i, j} ∈ L. Then, by Condition (2) of Definition 1, B j = K. Continuing this procedure as long as there are
components consisting of more than one player, we obtain the unique admissible n-tuple of coalitions with
Bi = N. 
We show that for games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution coincides with
the solution introduced in Herings et al. (2008) for this particular class of games. When (N,L) is cycle-free,
let T i, i ∈ N, be the unique spanning tree with node i as its root. The spanning tree T i determines a marginal





{ j′ |( j, j′)∈T i}
v(Kij′ ), j ∈ N, (3)
where, for j ∈ N, Kij is the set of nodes consisting of j and all its subordinates in T
i. The average tree solution
for games with cycle-free communication structure as introduced in Herings et al. (2008) then yields the
average of these n marginal contribution vectors.







Proof. By Lemma 2 we have that for any i ∈ N there is a unique admissible n-tuple of coalitions with Bi = N.
Let B(i) be this n-tuple of coalitions. From the construction in the proof of Lemma 2, it follows immediately
that the spanning tree T B(i) corresponding to B(i) coincides with the unique spanning tree T i having i as its
root. Hence mi(N,v,L) = mB(i)(N,v,L) for all i ∈ N. 
Next we prove that for games with complete communication structure the average tree solution coincides
with the Shapley value.
Lemma 3. Let (N,L) be a complete graph. Then there are n! admissible n-tuples of coalitions.
Proof. For an arbitrarily chosen player i1 ∈ N, we consider the collection of all admissible n-tuples B
with Bi1 = N. At each step k, k = 2, . . . ,n, we take an arbitrarily chosen player ik in Bik−1 \ {ik−1} and set
Bik = Bik−1 \ {ik−1}. Since at each step, any player in the remaining set can be chosen, there are n! admissible
n-tuples of coalitions. 
Theorem 2. Let (N,v,L) be a game with complete communication structure. Then the average tree solution
is equal to the Shapley value of (N,v).
Proof. For a game (N,v), the Shapley value φ(N,v) is equal to the average of all n! marginal vectors mπ(v).
Let B be an admissible n-tuple of coalitions constructed in the proof of Lemma 3. For the player ik chosen
at step k, the marginal contribution mBik (N,v,L) is equal to v(Bik )− v(Bik+1 ), where Bin+1 = ∅. We define a
bijection between admissible n-tuple of coalitions B and permutations π by assigning permutation πB, given
by πBik = n + 1− ik, k = 1, . . . ,n, to admissible n-tuple of coalitions B. By definition of the marginal vector we
have that mπ
B
(v) = mB(N,v,L). 
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5. Core properties
In this section we provide conditions for arbitrary games with communication structure under which the
average tree solution lies in the core. For a game (N,v) it is well-known that the Shapley-value φ(N,v) is in
the core C(N,v) if the game is convex, i.e., v(S ) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪T ) + v(S ∩T ) for every S ,T ⊂ N. A game is
superadditive if these inequalities are satisfied for all S and T with S ∩T = ∅. Superadditivity is insufficient
to ensure that a game has a non-empty core. We say that a game with communication structure (N,v,L) is
superadditive if its Myerson restricted game (N,vL) is superadditive. It can be shown that a superadditive
game with cycle-free communication structure has a non-empty core. In particular, it follows from Demange
(2004) that any marginal contribution vector mi(N,v,L) as defined in equation (3) is in C(N,vL). In fact, when
vL is superadditive, then vL is permutationally convex for any permutation corresponding to the spanning
tree T i and then, according to Granot and Huberman (1982), mi(N,v,L) is in C(N,vL) for all i ∈ N. So,
for superadditive games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution is in C(N,v,L),
because the core is convex. Also for games with cycle-free communication structure, Talman and Yamamoto
(2008) provide a condition even weaker than superadditivity under which the average tree solution is still in
the core. We next introduce the notion of link-convexity, which will be shown to assure that the average tree
solution is an element of the core for an arbitrary game with communication structure.
Definition 4. Link-convexity
A game with communication structure (N,v,L) is link-convex if




for any S ,T ⊂ N that satisfy
(1) S , T, S \T, T \S , and (S \T )∪ (T \S ) are non-empty networks,
(2) N \S or N \T is a network.
Notice that Condition (1) of Definition 4 implies that S ∪T is a non-empty network.
Link-convexity reduces to convexity for the class of games with complete communication structure be-
cause for those games all subsets of N are networks and convexity is satisfied trivially when S , T, S \T, or
T \S equals the empty set. We illustrate the notion by an example.
Example 2. (Cycle graph)
We consider the graph (N,L) with L = {{i, i + 1} | i = 1, . . . ,n}, where n + 1 = 1. In this case any non-empty
network has form S = [i, j], where [i, j] denotes the set {i, i + 1, i + 2, . . . , j} if j ≥ i and [i, j] denotes the set
{i, i + 1, . . . ,n,1, . . . , j} if j < i. Observe that for any S = [i, j], the set N \S is a network. By Condition (1) of
Definition 4 we must have that both S and T are non-empty networks, so for some i, i′, j, j′, S = [i, i′] and
T = [ j, j′]. Then both N \S and N \T are networks, so Condition (2) of Definition 4 is redundant. Without
loss of generality assume that j ≥ i. Then the condition that S \T and T \S are non-empty, requires that j > i.
Now, if j , i′ + 1 then we must have that j′ = i−1, otherwise (S \T )∪ (T \S ) is not a network. Therefore,
for the game with cyclic communication structure the link-convexity property requires that v(S ) + v(T ) ≤
v(S ∪T ) + v(S ∩T ) for all sets S = [i, i′] and T = [ j, j′] such that j > i and further j = i′+ 1 or j′ = i−1. 
Theorem 3. If the game with communication structure (N,v,L) is link-convex, then AT (N,v,L) ∈C(N,v,L).
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Proof. Consider any B ∈ BL and S ∈CL(N). We write mB = mB(N,v,L). We show that
∑
i∈S mBi ≥ v(S ), from
which it follows that mB ∈C(N,v,L), which proves the result because the core is a convex set.
Consider the subgraph (S ,T B(S )). It has components S 1, . . . ,S k′ which are all trees, with roots r1, . . . ,rk′ .
Without loss of generality, let r1, . . . ,rk′ be such that k1 < k2 implies Brk1 ⊂ Brk2 or Brk1 ∩ Brk2 = ∅. For
k = 0, . . . ,k′, let Bk = Br1 ∪ · · ·∪Brk , so it follows that B
0 = ∅.
For k = 1, . . . ,k′, those successors of S k in the tree T B that lie outside S are denoted by Frk . Recall that
the successors of a player are his immediate subordinates. We write R = {r1, . . . ,rk′ } and I = ∪r∈RFr. We
define a tree T ∗ with root rk′ on the nodes in R∪ I, where the successors of a node r ∈ R are given by Fr and
the successors of a node i ∈ I are given by
Fi = {r ∈ R | Br ⊂ Bi and @r′ ∈ R \ {r} such that Br ⊂ Br′ ⊂ Bi}.
Consider some k ∈ {1, . . . ,k′} and write Frk = {i1, . . . , i`′ }. If Frk = ∅, then we define `
′ to be zero. When
`′ ≥ 1, then, for ` = 1, . . . , `′, the two sets S ∪Bk−1∪ (Bi1 ∪· · ·∪Bi`−1 ) and Bi` satisfy Conditions (1) and (2) of
Definition 4. Notice that the components of their possibly empty intersection are the networks Br for r ∈ Fi`
and that Bi` \ (∪r∈Fi` Br) is linked to S k. Now it follows from link-convexity that for ` = 1, . . . , `
′,
v(S ∪Bk−1∪ (Bi1 ∪ · · ·∪Bi`−1 )) + v(Bi` ) ≤ v(S ∪B




By repeated application of this argument and since S k∪Bk−1∪(∪i∈Frk Bi) = B










Notice that this formula is also valid if Frk = ∅, since then S ∪B
k−1 = S ∪Bk.
















Since S ∪ Bk
′
= Brk′ and T
∗ is a tree, it follows that every Brk , k = 1, . . . ,k
′ − 1, appears exactly once in the




















From equations (4) and (5) it follows that v(S ) ≤
∑
i∈S mBi , which completes the proof. 
Corollary 1. If a game with communication structure (N,v,L) is link-convex, then the core C(N,v,L) is
non-empty.
8
For games with complete communication structure link-convexity and convexity coincide with each
other. The next lemma shows that under weaker conditions than superadditivity, a game with cycle-free
communication structure is link-convex.
Theorem 4. A game with cycle-free communication structure (N,v,L) is link-convex if and only if for every
S ∈CL(N) it holds that
v(S ) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪T ) for all T ∈ ĈL(N \S ).
Proof. Let S ,T ⊂ N satisfy the conditions in Definition 4 with N \T being a network. We first show that
S ∩T = ∅. Suppose S ∩T , ∅. Take any i′ ∈ S ∩T . Since S \T and T \S are non-empty and (S \T )∪ (T \S )
is a non-empty network, there exists i ∈ S \ T and j ∈ T \ S such that {i, j} ∈ L. Since both S and T are
networks, there exists a path in S connecting i and i′ and there exists a path in T connecting j and i′. This
contradicts the fact that (N,v,L) is a game with cycle-free communication structure.
From S ∩T = ∅, it follows that S ⊂ N \T. Since both N \T and S ∪T are networks, S ⊂ N \T, and (N,L)
is cycle-free, we must have T ∈ ĈL(N \S ). 
The lemma shows that the condition v(S ) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪T ) only has to hold for any network S and any
network T that is a component of (N \ S ,L(N \ S )). Notice that for a game with cycle-free communication
structure superadditivity requires that v(S ) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪T ) for any disjoint S and T such that S , T, and
S ∪T are networks.
Corollary 2. A game with cycle-free communication structure (N,v,L) is link-convex if v is superadditive.
The following example illustrates that link-convexity is strictly weaker than superadditivity and also that
the Myerson value may not be in the core if the game is link-convex.
Example 3. (Path graph)
We consider the cycle-free graph on (N,L) with L = {{ j, j + 1} | j = 1, . . . ,n− 1}. Any non-empty network
S is of the form S = [i, j], 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, where [i, j] = {i, . . . , j}. By Theorem 4, link-convexity requires
v(S ) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪T ) for all coalitions S and T such that S = [i, j] and T = [1, i−1] or T = [ j + 1,k].
Consider the path graph with N = 4 and L = {{1,2}, {2,3}, {3,4}}. The values of the connected coali-
tions are given by v({1}) = v({4}) = 0, v({2}) = 2, v({3}) = 4, v([1,2]) = v([2,3]) = 2, v([3,4]) = 4, v([1,3]) =
v([2,4]) = 6, and v([1,4]) = 6. This game is not superadditive, since for the networks S = {2} and T = {3} we
have that v([2,3]) = 2 < v({2}) + v({3}) = 6. Link-convexity only requires that
v([1, j]) + v([ j + 1,k]) ≤ v([1,k]), j = 1,2,3, j + 1 ≤ k ≤ 4,
v([i, j]) + v([ j + 1,4]) ≤ v([i,4]), i = 2,3, i ≤ j < 4.
All these inequalities are satisfied. Observe that this game has a unique core element (0,2,4,0)>.
The average tree solution for this game is equal to the average of the marginal contribution vectors of the
spanning trees induced by the four admissible 4-tuples B1 = (N, {2,3,4}, {3,4}, {4}), B2 = ({1},N, {3,4}, {4}),
B3 = ({1}, {1,2},N, {4}), and B4 = ({1}, {1,2}, {1,2,3},N). All these 4-tuples yield the same marginal contribu-
tion vector, (0,2,4,0)>.
To compute the Myerson value of the game, we first determine the Myerson restricted game (N,vL). For
S ∈ CL(N) we have vL(S ) = v(S ) and for S < CL(N) we have vL({1,3}) = 4, vL({1,4}) = 0, vL({2,4}) = 2,
vL({1,3,4}) = 4, and vL({1,2,4}) = 2.








Notice that the Myerson value lies outside the core. 
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6. Concluding remarks
In this paper the average tree solution is proposed for the class of all games with communication struc-
ture. This solution generalizes both the solution introduced by Herings et al. (2008) for the class of games
with cycle-free communication structure and the Shapley value for the class of games with complete com-
munication structure. We introduce the condition of link-convexity under which the average tree solution is
an element of the core. For the class of games with cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is
weaker than superadditivity. In general, link-convexity is weaker than convexity, and only coincides with it
for games with complete communication structure.
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